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SOLIDARITY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL 
VALUE 
Tamar Hostovsky Brandes* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the face of threats posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, solidarity 
has become the term of the hour. The World Health Organization (WHO) 
organized a “solidarity series of events” under the hashtag “together at
home.”1 WHO chose the title “Solidarity” for the ambitious global initia-
tive to find a treatment for the virus, establishing a “Solidarity” response
fund.2 The pandemic, it was stressed, was a challenge that could only be 
mitigated through mutual assistance and cooperation among countries
and individuals worldwide.
Solidarity was invoked as necessary in the fight against COVID-19
not only in the global arena, but also domestically. While no one is im-
mune from the virus, some are more vulnerable than others. Social dis-
tancing measures and various limitations were employed in many coun-
tries, their need often stressed as crucial for protecting both society as a
whole and vulnerable individuals. In addition, the economic toll of the
pandemic raised calls for mutual support. Many states provided some
degree of economic relief or assistance. 
Yet, as the crisis unfolded, objections to restrictions and require-
ments emerged. The price that was required, some argued, in terms of
* Tamar Hostovsky Brandes is a Senior Lecturer (Associate Professor) at
Ono Academic College’s Faculty of Law in Israel. She earned her J.S.D and LL.M.
degrees from Columbia Law School, where she was a Finkelstein Fellow, and her
LL.B. from Tel-Aviv University. She teaches and researches in the areas of inter-
national and constitutional law, focusing on the intersection between interna-
tional law and domestic law, and on the intersection of law and political theory,
and has published extensively in these areas.
1. The Solidarity Series of Events, https://www.who.int/news-room/cam-
paigns/connecting-the-world-to-combat-coronavirus/together-at-home (Aug. 8,
2020).
2. Help Fight Covid-19, https://covid19responsefund.org/en/?ms=wef (Au]p
8, 2020). The European Union has also established a conjoined solidarity effort
to fight Covid-19. See “Team Europe” - Global EU Response to Covid-19 support-
ing partner countries and fragile population, EUROPEAN UNION EXTERNAL ACTION, 
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homep-
age/77470/%E2%80%9Cteam-europe%E2%80%9D-global-eu-response-covid-19-
supporting-partner-countries-and-fragile-populations_en (Aug. 20, 2020).
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60 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27
freedom and economic burdens, was simply too high.3 Indeed, countries
differ in the scientific presumptions they rely on for adopting a health
strategy to manage the COVID-19 crisis. However, they also differ in
their approaches to the basic question of who owes what to whom, and to
what extent mutual consideration should turn to mandatory require-
ments. As a result, different approaches emerged with respect to ques-
tions such as the extent to which the state is responsible for compensat-
ing those economically affected by the pandemic, the extent to which
restrictions and social distancing measures could be imposed, and 
whether wearing masks could be mandatorily required.4 
The different approaches in responding to the COVID-19 crisis can,
in part, be explained by the different social perceptions of solidarity and 
the duties that stem from it. The notion of solidarity, explored below, un-
derlies the web of mutual commitments among members of a community, 
and, in the case of states, among members of the political community.
In this article, I examine the notion of solidarity as a constitutional
value. Constitutions entrench the founding principles of the political
community.5 Narratives of solidarity are woven into Constitutions both
implicitly and explicitly. I argue that, despite the prevalence of the notion
of solidarity in Constitutions worldwide, constitutional scholarship has
paid relatively little attention to it. I call for recognition and discussion 
of the significance, the potential and perils of recognizing solidarity as a
constitutional value or principle.  
3. One contentious question brought up in public debates is whether elderly
and other vulnerable individuals could be expected to self-isolate for the sake of
economic activity. For a rejection of this proposition, see, for example, Florian
Fischer et al., COVID-19 and the Elderly: Who Cares?, in FRONT. IN PUB. HEALTH
151 (Eric Nguemeleu Tchouaket ed., 2020).
4. For reviews of country responses to Covid-19 in various areas, see Lex-
Atlas: Covid-19, lexatlas-c19.org; Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, COVID-19 Meets Politics:
The Novel Coronavirus as a Novel Challenge for Legislatures, in THE THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF LEGISLATION (Ronan Cormacain & Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov eds., 2020);
Int’l Lab. Org., COVID-19 and the world of work, https://www.ilo.org/global/top-
ics/coronavirus/lang—en/index.htm (Aug. 23, 2020) (examining responses of var-
ious countries with regard to stimulation of the economy and the protection of
employees); European Center for Disease Prevention and Control, Country re-
sponses measurers to COVID-19 (examining health measures employed by EU
countries), https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/coronavirus/lang—en/index.htm
(Aug. 23, 2020); IMF, Policy Responses to COVID-19, https://www.imf.org/en/Top-
ics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19 (Aug. 23, 2020); Covid-19
Law Lab, https://covidlawlab.org/ (Aug. 23, 2020).
5. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 215 (William Rehg trans., 1996).































The article examines how different constitutions define and perceive
solidarity. I look at constitutionally entrenched notions of domestic,
transnational, and cosmopolitan solidarity. I argue that solidarity is the 
basis of the mutual commitments that exist in a political community, and 
that in order to ensure that such commitments are defined and imposed 
in a just manner, it is important to recognize how the boundaries of the
solidarity group are defined, who is included and who is excluded from
such group, and what the nature of solidarity in a given community is. 
Constitutional law, I argue, plays a role in shaping these boundaries. Fi-
nally, I argue that although constitutional solidarity may intuitively be 
expected to endorse only intra-state solidarity - solidarity among mem-
bers of the political community - constitutions can and do endorse notions 
of transnational solidarity. I thus argue that constitutionalism can be an 
important source of bottom-up transnational and global solidarity. 
The article proceeds as follows: Section 1 examines the notion of sol-
idarity as it is understood in the political theory literature, its relation-
ship to the political community, and, accordingly, to the imposition of du-
ties and the enjoyment of rights. Section 2 examines the role of solidarity 
as a constitutional notion. Section 3 offers a comparative typology of con-
stitutional references to solidarity as a constitutional principle or value. 
Section 4 argues that since constitutions are often perceived as the em-
bodiment of a particular social contract, constitutional solidarity may in-
tuitively be associated with intra-state solidarity. However, comparative
research demonstrates that constitutions include references not only to
intra-state solidarity but also to various forms of transnational solidar-
ity. Section 5 briefly examines the normative implications of the compar-
ative analysis. It suggests that solidarity can serve as a guiding principle
in constitutional interpretation, and, in particular, as an anchor for rec-
ognizing the rights of and protecting the underprivileged and marginal-
ized members of a society. It also argues, however, that a constitutional
principle of solidarity can be a source for encouraging solidarity beyond
the domestic political community. In this respect, constitutional law can
be an important source for fostering bottom-up transnational solidarity, 
in a manner that may be perceived as reflective of the “people’s will,” 
which supplements and strengthens the top-down transnational solidar-
ity that international instruments and institutions attempt to encourage.
Section 6 concludes, and outlines questions for further research. 
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62 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27
I.WHAT IS SOLIDARITY? 
The concept of solidarity is used differently by psychologists, sociol-
ogists, and political theorists. Laitinen and Pessi explain that the term
derives from Latin, and that in the Roman Law “obligatio in solidum in-
volved the group liability of joint debtors.” “Gradually,” they explain, “the 
word came to be used in a broader meaning of emotionally and norma-
tively motivated readiness for mutual support.”6 
Indeed, most uses of the term solidarity revolve around the existence
of mutual commitments among members of a group.7 Solidarity is a
multi-faceted concept. It is used to describe both a set of attitudes and
the practices that may derive from these attitudes. Solidarity is applied 
to characterize the emotions and the acts of individuals, but also de-
scribes a social phenomenon.8 
Questions regarding the existence and nature of solidarity may be
asked with respect to various types of groups, like small groups such as 
families and close-knit communities, large political communities, or even 
humanity as a whole. Solidarity can be examined in professional contexts
and within social classes. The term “solidarity” has played a central role 
in class struggles across states and continents.9 The nature and basis of
solidarity thus depends, at least to some extent, on how the group at
stake, i.e., the solidarity group, is defined.10 
In their introduction to an edited volume on solidarity in political 
theory, Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka argue that solidarity among 
6. Arto Laitinen & Anne Birgitta Pessi, Introduction, in SOLIDARITY: THEORY
AND PRACTICE (Laitinenn & Pessi eds., 2018). For a discussion of the development
of the notion of solidarity, see HAUKE BRUNKHORST, SOLIDARITY: FROM CIVIC
FRIENDSHIP TO A GLOBAL LEGAL COMMUNITY (Jeffrey Flynn trans., 2005).
7. Kurt Bayertz, Four Uses of Solidarity, in SOLIDARITY 3 (Kurt Bayertz ed.,
1999). Alejandro Colás argues that “in its most basic formulation, the concept
refers to a sense of unity among individuals which arises out of shared socio-
historical experiences - or in a weaker form, out of an affective empathy - and
which binds these individuals in the collective pursuit of a specific political goal
. . . . In a stronger, ‘thicker’ rendition of the term, those engaged in ties of solidar-
ity also accept the existence of reciprocal moral duties.” Alejandro Colás, Taking
sides: cosmopolitanism, internationalism and ‘complex solidarity’ in the work of
Fred Halliday, 87(5) INT’L AFFAIRS 1051, 1056 (2011). 
8. David Miller, Solidarity and Its Sources, in THE STRAINS OF COMMITMENT:
THE POLITICAL SOURCES OF SOLIDARITY IN DIVERSE SOCIETIES 61, 62-63 (Keith
Banting & Will Kymlicka eds., 2017) [hereinafter STRAINS OF COMMITMENT].
9. See, e.g., Nicholas H. Smith, Solidarity and Work: A Reassessment, in
SOLIDARITY, supra note 6.
10. Miller explains that for there to be “solidarity among” members of a
group there first needs to be a group. Miller, supra note 8, at 63.
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 632020-2021] Solidarity
members of a political community is a necessary condition for the func-
tioning of “just institutions,” as well as for the existence of a “just society”
– one that seeks to protect the vulnerable, ensure equal opportunities,
and mitigate undeserved inequalities.11 
Banting and Kymlicka focus on what they term “bounded solidar-
ity.”12 Bounded solidarity can be understood as solidarity among mem-
bers of a given political community. The “solidarity group” in this analy-
sis encompasses, at the least, all citizens of the state.  Bounded solidarity 
is often perceived to be competing with, if not contradictory to, other 
forms of solidarity such as transnational solidarity and cosmopolitan sol-
idarity. This perception is based on the belief that emphasizing the spe-
cial commitments among members of a certain group will undermine the
group members’ commitments towards non-members. 
Intra-group solidarity has thus been treated with suspicion by inter-
nationalists and viewed as damaging to the cosmopolitan enterprise. 
Alejandro Colás discusses solidarity in what he refers to as “the cosmo-
politan-communitarian debate in IR.”13 Colás argues that for cosmopoli-
tans, solidarity is, or should be, a global principle. Meanwhile communi-
tarians are doubtful about the ability of establishing solidarity on a 
global scale and believe that in a “thick” sense, it can only exist in smaller
political communities.14 Simon Derpmann notes that in philosophical lit-
erature, the alleged opposition between solidarity and cosmopolitanism
is associated with “an opposition between obligations originating in the 
membership to communities and obligations equally owed to everyone.”15 
He contends that “one could say that obligations of solidarity are not uni-
versal, but communal in the sense that not everyone, but only the mem-
bers of a community have these obligations. And not everyone, but only
members of the community can make the corresponding claims.”16 
The association of solidarity with communitarianism has led cosmo-
politans and liberal thinkers to stir away from the concept of solidarity.
Banting and Kymlicka argue that societal based solidarity has been
11. Keith Banting & Will Kymlicka, Introduction, in STRAINS OF 
COMMITMENT, supra note 8, at 6.
12. Id.  
13. Colás, supra note 7, at 1057.
14. Id. Fuyuki Kurasawa similarly discusses “cosmopolitans’ distrust of
thick social relations — which they equate too readily with the primordialism of
ethno-nationalism and other ‘pre-political’ identities.” Fuyuki Kurasawa, A Cos-
mopolitanism from Below: Alternative Globalization and the Creation of a Soli-
darity without Bounds, 45(2) EUR. J. OF SOC. 233, 234 (2004).
15. Simon Derpmann, Solidarity and Cosmopolitanism, 12(3) ETHICAL
THEORY & MORAL PRACTICE 303, 303 (2009). 
16. Id.  at 305.
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64 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27
considered by liberal scholars “at best mythical, and at worst dangerous
and exclusionary.”17 They contend that it is essential for the functioning 
of a state in general and a welfare state in particular. 
The argument that some degree of solidarity is necessary for the ex-
istence of a modern state is widely accepted. However, there is less agree-
ment on concrete questions regarding the nature and content of solidar-
ity. For example, there are different answers to the questions of what the 
implied commitments among members of a political community are and
who is included in the group within which such commitments exist. There 
are also different positions regarding the conditions required for solidar-
ity to exist, and whether it can be actively fostered when it is weak or
lacking. These three questions can be summarized as the who, what and
how aspects of solidarity. 
In addition, a question that is of particular importance is whether 
intra-state, “bounded solidarity” necessarily conflicts with transnational 
solidarity and cosmopolitan solidarity. Derpmann argues that “the cen-
tral question in the present discourse [on solidarity and cosmopolitanism] 
is to what extent cosmopolitan identities and obligations can – or should 
– compete with national identities and obligations of solidarity.”18 Cos-
mopolitans generally argue that all human beings owe moral (and some-
times legal) commitments to one another. Recognizing special commit-
ments among members of the group is often perceived as weakening such
universal commitments.19 
If bounded solidarity weakens cosmopolitan solidarity, strengthen-
ing intra-state solidarity and strengthening transnational solidarity
would be conflicting projects. There is little empirical indication that this
is the case.20 Populist, nationalist politicians often portray the two as a
dichotomy and as a justification to undermine the legitimacy of interna-
tional institutions.21 However, just as people are capable of having a web 
of attachments and connections, of different types and levels, they are 
capable of having similar complex types of solidarity. 
The issue of solidarity within a political community can be explored
from empirical and normative perspectives.22 From an empirical
17. Banting & Kymlicka, supra note 11, at 5. 
18. Derpmann, supra note 15, at 307.
19. See  id. at 306-07.
20. Some argue that it is even the other way around, that is, that experiences
of trust in one’s close circle may expand externally. For discussion and critique,
see Miller, supra note 8, at 67. 
21. See Tamar Hostovsky Brandes, International Law in Domestic Courts in
an Era of Populism, 17(2) INT’L J. OF CONST. L. 576, 576-77 (2019).
22. For a description of normative and factual facets of solidarity, see Carol 
C. Gould, Transnational Solidarities, 38(1) J. OF SOC. PHIL. 148, 149 (2007). 






















    
 
  






perspective, one may ask if within a given political community, there is
solidarity among all members of society. This is not always the case: mi-
norities, for example, may be excluded from the main and dominant so-
cietal solidarity group. To the extent that mutual duties are derived from
the notion of solidarity, those excluded from the main group may be per-
ceived as less deserving of social benefits or of protection of the state’s 
institutions.  
One may also ask what the basis and nature of solidarity within po-
litical communities is. One issue that is disputed among scholars regards
the extent to which a shared cultural identity is required for solidarity to
exist. Emile Durkheim, the scholar most associated with the notion of 
solidarity, famously distinguished between mechanical solidarity and or-
ganic solidarity as two different types of solidarity, which characterized, 
simple, non-industrialized societies versus complex, industrialized socie-
ties.23 Some argue that a shared cultural and historical background is the
basis of solidarity within a political community. Other argued that even
if a “thick” similarity is not precondition for the existence of solidarity, at
least a thin shared identity is requited if solidarity is to exist.  
David Miller suggests that “no one theory can offer a complete ex-
planation” of solidarity, and highlights three main theories as identifying
“factors that plausibly contribute to society-wide solidarity,” in particu-
lar, when operating in conjunction.24 The first is the associational theory,
which argues that solidarity emerges from “people’s participation in a
range of civil and political associations.”25 The second is the identity the-
ory, which contends that solidarity is rooted in a shared identity.26 The
third is the institutional theory. This theory suggests that the causes and 
effects of solidarity might be reversed, and that “solidarity is actually the
effect of a society’s policies and institutions rather than their (indirect) 
cause.”27 Miller argues that each of these three theories correctly identi-
fies factors that promote solidarity, but that “they also seem to be more
powerful when operating in conjunction.”28 
The scholarly debate on the nature of solidarity often fails to distin-
guish between the definition of solidarity and the conditions necessary 
for solidarity to flourish. For example, this is demonstrated in Hart’s re-
sponse to the claim that a shared commitment to a particular morality is
23. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 174 (George Simp-
son trans., 2014). 
24. Miller, supra note 8, at 75. Miller reviews five theories of the sources of
solidarity but perceives the above-discussed three to be the central ones. 
25. Id. at 71.
26. Id. at 73.
27. Id. at 74.
28. Id. at 76.
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66 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27
the basis of solidarity. Hart argues that this claim was empirically un-
founded and was only true if solidarity was defined to begin with as hav-
ing a shared morality.29  Similar claims can be made regarding the thesis
that solidarity is based on shared histories, shared experiences, or shared 
values.30 
The minimalist definition of solidarity, which stresses the existence
of a sense of mutual commitments, without asking why such a sense of
commitments exists is helpful in avoiding confusion. Another distinction 
that should be maintained is the distinction between the predisposition 
to support and assist members of the group, and the actual duties or acts
that may stem from it. This distinction can be thought of as the distinc-
tion between the sense or emotion of solidarity, and “acts of solidarity” –
the latter being a manifestation of the former.31 
From a normative perspective, one may ask whether solidarity 
within specific groups — the family, the state, humanity, etc. — is de-
sired, and if so, why. In addition, one may ask whether particular types 
of solidarity are morally or normatively legitimate. Thus, for example, a
solidarity group may be constructed in an exclusionary manner, so that
commitments are not equally owed to members of minorities or may be 
construed as conditional upon the fulfilment of certain conditions.32 The
fact that, from an empirical perspective, a political community embraces
a certain ethos of solidarity should not prevent us from critically exam-
ining it. 
Finally, since solidarity is the basis of mutual duties, it can easily
be employed to justify or require limitations on individual freedom. This, 
in itself, should not hinder us from recognizing the value of solidarity. 
For example, the requirement to wear face masks, primarily for the pro-
tection of others, has been justified as a duty that stems from and mani-
fests solidarity. The claim that it infringes upon individual freedom is
formally correct, but it does not imply that the expectation of solidarity
is not legitimate in this context. 
29. H. L. A. Hart, Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morality, 35 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 4 (1967).
30. Miller, supra note 8.
31. For a discussion of the dispute regarding the centrality of the emotional 
aspects of solidarity, see Mikko Salmela, Collective Emotions as “the Glue” of
Group Solidarity, in SOLIDARITY, supra note 6.
32. Derpmann, supra note 15, at 306. Brunkhorst perceives solidarity as
instrumental for the function of modern democracies. BRUNKHORST, supra note 6,
at 2. Elsewhere, I demonstrated how the lack of solidarity may undermine equal-
ity and justice. See Tamar Hostovsky Brandes, Law, Citizenship and Social Sol-
idarity: Israel’s “Loyalty-Citizenship” Laws as a Test Case, 6(1) POLITICS, GROUPS
& IDENTITIES 39 (2018).

















     
  













Solidarity may be argued to be valuable both inherently and instru-
mentally.33 Inherently, one may argue that having a sense of solidarity is
a virtue in itself.  I am more interested, however, in the instrumental
value of solidarity, and, in particular, the role of solidarity in enabling 
and facilitating the existence of just societies.34 
II. SOLIDARITY AND JUSTICE 
Under the minimal definition, the notion of solidarity expresses the 
commitment of members of a group to each other’s well-being. It is thus, 
arguably, a basis of members’ willingness to bear the costs and sacrifices
that may be required to secure the well-being of other members of the 
group. Laitinen and Pessi argue that “solidarity is often based on we-
thinking, it can be separated from not only anti-social egocentrism, but 
also from one-sided “thou-centrism” such as altruism, sympathy, caring,
or Christian charity.”35 The latter may also initiate people to contribute
to others’ well-being, but the manner in which such contribution is made
is sporadic and individualistic. The collective and inter-dependent nature 
of solidarity renders it more a more reliable and stable source for gener-
ating a willingness to act in the benefit of others in a constant, ongoing,
and recurrent manner. To the extent that a just society is one in which 
members take care of each other, and if we believe that the existence of 
such a society is a goal that should be strived towards, solidarity among
members of the society is desirable. 
What “society” do we refer to when we talk about a “just society?” 
Normative and political scholarship generally focuses on two types of so-
cieties. The first is the political community, and its institutional embod-
iment, the state. The second is the global society. 
Jurgen Habermas explains that “accepting decisions whose conse-
quences have to be borne equally by all requires a form of abstract
33. Miller similarly distinguishes between solidarity as intrinsically valua-
ble, and solidarity as instrumentally valuable. He argues that intrinsically, soli-
darity may fulfill certain human needs, and that instrumentally, solidarity may
promise individuals protection and serve as “a break on inequality.” Miller, supra
note 8, at 66.
34. Colás notes that “solidarity is not a moral end in itself, but merely a
means in the attainment of moral goods such as liberty or equality.” Colás, supra
note 7, at 6.
35. SOLIDARITY, supra note 6, at 2.
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68 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27
solidarity that was first produced during the nineteenth century between
citizens of different nation-states.”36 He further argues that: 
Constructed through the medium of modern law, the modern terri-
torial state thus depends on the development of a national consciousness 
to provide it with the cultural substrate for a civil solidarity. With this
solidarity, the bonds that had formed between members of a concrete
community on the basis of personal relationships now change into a new, 
more abstract form. While remaining strangers to one another, members
of the same “nation” feel responsible enough for one another that they 
are prepared to make “sacrifices” – as in military service or the burden
of redistributive taxation.37 
Habermas perceives solidarity to be the foundation for which con-
crete duties can be derived. These concrete duties may change over time
and place. For example, the COVID-19 pandemic gave birth to a set of 
duties that did not previously exist, such as the duty to maintain social 
distance and the duty to wear face masks. 
It is self-evident that economic redistribution, military service, and 
even wearing masks, require members of a state to make concessions for 
the well-being of other members. In fact, ensuring almost every aspect of 
justice, from social and economic rights to individual freedom, requires
some members of the community to incur a price. This price includes
both the fiscal cost of protecting and enforcing such rights, a cost that
society as a whole must incur, and the compromises that individuals may
be required to make with respect to their own comfort and preferences in
order to ensure that the rights of others are realized.38 
The concept of solidarity is commonly justified by imposing duties
upon individuals and is thus usually associated with the duty side of the
rights-duties equation.  However,  solidarity is also a precondition for the
ability of individuals to realize rights, in that it defines who duties are 
owed to and what duties are owed. 
If solidarity is the predisposition that underlies social duties that
are required to construct a just society, then political communities that 
strive for justice, and their institutionalized form as states, have a legit-
imate interest in protecting, facilitating, and enhancing solidarity. No-
tions of solidarity can be of varying thicknesses and are often tied to par-
ticular perception of justice. A political community may have a thin 
36. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE POSTNATIONAL CONSTELLATION: POLITICAL 
ESSAYS 17-18 (2001).
37. Id. at 64.
38. Banting and Kymlicka distinguish between three different dimensions
of solidarity: civil solidarity, democratic solidarity, and redistributive solidarity.
Banting & Kymlicka, supra note 11, at 4. 







   





   
  
 




   













notion of solidarity, under which members have a disposition to ensure
that all members have the minimum conditions required for survival, or
a thick notion of solidarity, under which members consider themselves to 
be committed to ensure each other a certain standard of living and life-
opportunities.
It is important to emphasize that as a factual matter, a political com-
munity may endorse a notion of solidarity that does not promote justice.
For example, an exclusionary notion of solidarity, one under which cer-
tain members of society are perceived as “less deserving” than others to
receive social benefits or state protection, is a notion of solidarity that
does not facilitate justice. This should not deter us from adopting solidar-
ity as an important notion. To the contrary, precisely in these cases, sol-
idarity is useful as a term that can facilitate a critical discussion on jus-
tice in terms of inclusion and substantive citizenship, which the notion of 
equality alone often fails to capture.
Even if we are able to answer who a solidarity group encompasses
and what types of commitments it consists of, we still must address the 
question of how.  How and to what extent can all-encompassing, justice-
furthering solidarity be constituted, where it is weak or absent? 
As can be expected, this is a highly contested question among polit-
ical theorists. Within political theory literature, the scholarly debate on 
the nature and sources of solidarity revolves mostly around the degree to
which a shared cultural identity is a necessary condition in constituting
solidarity. This debate derives from the scholarship on multiculturalism 
that proliferated in the 90’s and echoes such scholarship. Accordingly,
the political theory scholarship on solidarity focuses, for the most part,
on the relationship between diversity and solidarity, on the relationship
between cultural majorities and minorities, and on the ability of different
types of national identities to sustain inclusive intra-state solidarity.39 
The empirical research leads to the unsatisfying, yet apparently un-
avoidable, conclusion that the conditions that breed solidarity are highly 
context specific. However, the important conclusion from this body of 
writing is that solidarity is not predetermined and can be actively en-
couraged and fostered.40 Banting and Kymlicka argue that “politics can
play a role in fostering solidarity,” and examine the role political actors,
institutions and policies play in this regard.41 
39. See, e.g., Jaclyn L. Neo et al., Solidarity in Diversity? State Responses to
Religious Diversity in Liberal and Non-Liberal Perspectives, 20 GERMAN L. REV. 
941, 942 (2019). 
40. Miller, supra note 8, at 75.
41. Banting & Kymlicka, supra note 11, at 32. 
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70 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27
Drawing on this argument, the following sections of this article ex-
amine the role that law,  in particular, constitutional law, plays in fos-
tering solidarity. If solidarity can be enhanced, constitutional law can be
relevant in enhancing it in at least two ways: first, constitutional en-
trenchment of solidarity allows the court to take it into consideration as 
a value worthy of protection in constitutional interpretation and consti-
tutional review. Second, the explicit endorsement of solidarity as a value
utilizes the expressive functions of constitutional law to send a message
regarding the existence of mutual commitments within a society.42 
The further sections demonstrate that many constitutions indeed 
refer to solidarity and explicitly recognize solidarity as a protected prin-
ciple or value. They also point out that constitutions embrace various and 
different conceptions of solidarity, which stem from states’ different his-
tories, social conditions, culture, perception of national identity, and 
more. The purpose of this examination is not to offer a comprehensive
comparative constitutional analysis of solidarity, but to suggest that con-
stitutional scholarship should pay attention to the notion of solidarity, if
only because the concept is so prevalent in constitutions worldwide. It
should be stressed that while this section focuses on explicit constitu-
tional references to solidarity or similar terms, such as fraternity, the
value or principle of solidarity is interwoven into constitutions inexplic-
itly, through other terms, and as part of states’ ‘“small-c” constitutions.
The normative aspect of the examination regards the role a consti-
tutional value of solidarity can and should play in construing constitu-
tional commitments and duties. Here, I argue that constitutional law can 
and should enhance multi-layered solidarity. First, I argue that within 
the state, constitutional solidarity should be employed to ensure inclu-
sive and equal protection of all citizens. Second, I argue that contrary to
what may be intuitively assumed, constitutional solidarity can be a 
source not only for intra-state, bounded solidarity, but also for solidarity 
beyond the boundaries of the state. Constitutional law can serve, in this
regard, as a bottom-up, grassroot source for transnational, cosmopolitan 
solidarity.  
42. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Symposium: Law, Economics & Norms: On
the Expressive Function of the Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2043 (1996). 





    
























      






III. SOLIDARITY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 
A. Solidarity as a Constitutional Value  
How can recognition of solidarity as a constitutional value be justi-
fied?43 The answer rests on the interrelationship between solidarity, con-
stitutionalism, and justice. I argued above that solidarity is instrumen-
tally valuable to the promotion of just societies, especially with the 
respect to the existence of mutual commitments and with respect to uni-
versal applications within society of such commitments. Constitutions 
also strive to set the foundations for just societies. However, countries
differ with respect to the type of justice that constitutions should ensure.
Roberto Garagrella distinguishes, in this regard, between various
approaches to the relationship between constitutions and justice. The
central distinction he proposes is the distinction between “a procedural
approach to the constitution,”44 and what he defines as a republican ap-
proach to constitutionalism. Garagrella argues that the former concen-
trates on ensuring “procedural justice” and is “agnostic in terms of dis-
tributive justice,”45 as opposed to “a constitution that expresses and
enforces a comprehensive view of justice.”46 Under the republican alter-
native, he argues, the constitution is “an expression of a social compact 
that aims to work for the common good.”47 The recognition of social rights
is associated with this alternative.48 
It is quite clear why solidarity can be argued to be a central value
under a Republican approach to constitutionalism. However, even a pro-
cedural, minimal approach needs to answer questions as to who is pro-
tected by constitutional guarantees, and what is required to ensure the
43. The proposition that constitutions should foster solidarity is sometimes
simply presupposed. Thus, for example, Alex Deagon argues that God should be
referenced in constitutions of democracies as a means of enhancing solidarity:
“Constitutional recognition of God is a blessing to democracy because it facilitates
the consideration of higher meaning and political solidarity, which helps demo-
cratic states pursue the good for all members of the community.” Alex Deagon,
The Name of God in a Constitution: Meaning, Democracy, and Political Solidar-
ity, 8(3) OX. J. L. RELIGION 473, 492 (2019). Without regard to whether this claim
is correct, Deagon presumes that it is the role of constitutions to promote such
solidarity.
44. Roberto Gargarella, The Constitution and Justice, in  THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK ON COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 336, 337 (Michel Rosenfeld &
András Sajó eds., 2012) [hereinafter OXFORD HANDBOOK].
45. Id. at 344.
46. Id. at 338.
47. Id. at 344.
48. Id. at 346.
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enjoyment of constitutional rights. Arguably, at least a thin notion of sol-
idarity a precondition for sustaining the latter.  
In arguing for recognition of solidarity as a constitutional value, I 
refer to the term “value”  in the broad, ethical sense, as a foundational 
principle that may or may not be explicitly referred to as a value.49 In-
deed, Gary Jacobsohn distinguishes between constitutional values and 
constitutional principles. Constitutional values, Jacobsohn argues, are 
often “culture and tradition bound,” while the constitutional principles
“are associated more often with matters that are less culture-bound than
one usually finds in the citation of values.”50 However, as Jacobsohn him-
self admits, the distinction is far from absolute and the two terms are
often used interchangeably.51 
Constitutional values play a role in constitutional adjudication and
interpretation. The reliance on such values may expose judges to criti-
cism, especially when resorting to values that are not explicitly referred
to in the constitution. Despite this, constitutional values are recognized
and applied by judges, particularly in controversial, difficult cases.52 Ja-
cobsohn argues that the interpretation of principles is part of the dialog-
ical process by which a country’s constitutional identity is developed.53 
This is also true for what I define here as constitutional values. 
Neomi Rao contrasts “European value-based constitutionalism”
with U.S. “rights-based constitutionalism,” by expressing the position 
that the former undermines the importance of rights by considering them 
as “just another interest in the democratic balance.”54 Writing about the
value of human dignity, Rao cautions against “importing the European
ideals of human dignity into American constitutional law.”55 Considering
that this proposition was put forward with respect to the individualistic 
value of human dignity, one could imagine that Rao would state it with 
extra force with respect to communitarian values such as solidarity. 
49. This definition is similar to the definition proposed in Dennis Davis et
al., Introduction, in AN INQUIRY INTO THE EXISTENCE OF GLOBAL VALUES: THROUGH
THE LENS OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1, 11 (Dennis Davis et al. eds.,
2015) [hereinafter GLOBAL VALUES].
50. Gary Jacobsohn, Constitutional Values and Principles, in  OXFORD
HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 693. 
51. This is particularly true with respect to the notion of solidarity, which
both refers generally to the existence of mutual commitments, and thus can be
described as a principle, but, when it appears in a constitution, its content is de-
termined by context, history and culture, and thus be classified as a value. 
52. See the various chapters in GLOBAL VALUES, supra note 49. 
53. Jacobsohn, supra note 50, at 337.
54. Neomi Rao, On the Use and Abuse of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 4
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 201, 204 (2008)
55. Id. at 201.
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Rao’s position represents a certain line of thinking regarding the re-
lationship between rights and values. Focusing on limitation clauses, she
argues that values weaken the protection of rights since values can be
balanced against rights where such clauses exist.56 However, this argu-
ment largely ignores the preconditions required for the realization of 
rights. Precisely because of U.S. constitutional history, one should be 
aware that prior to the analysis and interpretation of rights exists the
preliminary question of who is considered as deserving of such rights. 
The value of solidarity (and, arguably, also of human dignity) addresses
this preliminary question. This is not only a question of theory, but very 
much a question of practice; human history and experience have taught 
us that those excluded from the dominant solidarity group are also de-
prived of rights, even if the latter are constitutionally recognized.57 
If individual clauses of the constitution are to be interpreted in con-
formity with the general principles and values, a constitutional value of 
solidarity is particularly important with respect to the interpretation of
constitutional rights and duties. Constitutions often include provisions
that prescribe the content of rights and duties. The principle of solidarity
may be applied to instruct us who is entitled to particular constitutional
rights and who is obliged by particular constitutional duties, as well as,
a guiding principle in determining the content of rights, duties and public
interests.
B. Constitutional Solidarity: A Proposed Typology  
A comparative survey of world constitutions reveals that many con-
stitutions include explicit references to solidarity.58 Solidarity is often re-
ferred to in constitutions’ preambles, but also in specific articles of the
constitution. In most instances, solidarity does not appear as a single 
value or principle, but appears alongside other values.
While many constitutions refer to solidarity or fraternity, there are
great variations between constitutions with respect to both the solidarity
group recognized, and the basis and nature of solidarity as a value. In 
this section, I will broadly outline three different constitutional notions 
of solidarity that are found in constitutions world-wide: intra-state (or
“bounded”) solidarity, that is, solidarity that refers to the internal 
56. Id. at 228.
57. Habermas’ position is reflective of this realization. HABERMAS, supra note
36, at 18.
58. Constitute Project’s database coded 99 constitutions as including refer-
ences to solidarity or fraternity. See Constitute Project, https://www.consti-
tuteproject.org/search?lang=en&key=solid&status=in_force&status=is_draft
(Jan. 25, 2021). 
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political community as the solidarity group; transnational solidarity, a 
term which I use to include both solidarity between states and solidarity
among individuals across national borders; and general references to sol-
idarity that do not specifically refer to who is encompassed within the
solidarity group. Within each of these groups, there are variations with
respect to the nature and content of solidarity: the type of duties it en-
tails, the individuals or institutions obliged by such duties, the particular
ideology may be tied to (i.e., socialism, social democracy), and more. 
Two preliminary comments are required before turning to examine 
constitutional provisions. First, the typology below reviews only explicit
constitutional references to solidarity or fraternity. However, a constitu-
tional value of solidarity can, of course, be embedded in numerous non-
explicit manners: through references to the existence of mutual commit-
ments in various areas; through notions of peoplehood;59 and through
other, similar values. Such non-explicit references to solidarity can theo-
retically be classified in the same manner as explicit references to soli-
darity, that is, as intrastate, transnational, or general. Of course, per-
forming such classification will require a substantive, contextualized
reading of the constitution. 
Second, we should not attribute too much significance to the mere
fact that a given constitution explicitly refers to solidarity. As we well 
know, the gap between what is written in a constitution and law in action
is often wide, and values, as well as rights, enumerated in constitutions
are, in many instances, not respected in practice.60 Thus, the review be-
low does not suggest that countries the constitutions of which include 
explicit references to solidarity have higher levels of social solidarity or 
are more committed to fostering solidarity. Rather, the review supports
two more modest claims: first, that the fact that constitutions include 
solidarity as a value suggests that solidarity has a potential of playing a
significant role in constitutional interpretation and refutes the claim that
the notion of solidarity is irrelevant to constitutionalism. Second, it sug-
gests that national constitutions not only do not reject out-right transna-
tional solidarity, but, in many cases, endorse it.  
Of the constitutions that include explicit references to solidarity,
most references focus on internal solidarity, i.e., solidarity among
59. On peoplehood and Constitutionalism, see generally JO SHAW, THE 
PEOPLE IN QUESTION: CITIZENS AND CONSTITUTIONS IN UNCERTAIN TIMES (2020).
60. See, for example, David Law and Mila Verseeg’s findings regarding the 
lack of compliance with constitutional right guarantees. David Law & Mila
Veraseeg, Sham Constitutions, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 863, 876 (2013).


























   
 
    
  








members of the political community. Since constitutions are, arguably, 
the embodiment of the social compact of specific societies, this is not sur-
prising.61 In these references, the domestic political community is defined
as the solidarity group. Who is included in this group depends on how the 
political community is defined or perceived (arguably, this is also true
the other way around: the boundaries of solidarity define the political
community). What is emphasized as the basis of solidarity between mem-
bers of the political community is highly dependent upon history and cul-
ture.  
Intrastate solidarity may be described as encompassing all those
“belonging” to the political community. For example, Article 1 of the Co-
lombian Constitution declares Colombia to be a social state “based on the
respect of human dignity, the work and solidarity of the individuals who 
belong to it.”62 Or, it may refer explicitly to citizens. For example, Article
4(1) of the Romanian constitution declares “the State is founded upon the
unity of the Romanian people and the solidarity of its citizens.”63 
Emphasizing solidarity across inhabitants of all the national terri-
tory is also particularly common in states in which there are historical
and cultural differences or economic disparities between regions that are 
often accompanied by political tensions. For example, Article 75(2) of the
Argentinian Constitution endorses solidarity as one of the principles that
should guide distribution of resources “throughout the entire National
territory.”64 Article 2 of the Preliminary title to the Spanish Constitution
states that “the Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the 
Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards;
it recognizes and guarantees the right to self-government of the nation-
alities and regions of which it is composed and the solidarity among them 
all.”65 Article 3 of the Chilean Constitution states that “the State’s organs
will encourage the strengthening of the regionalization of the country 
and the equitable development and solidarity between regions, provinces
and communes of the national territory.”66 Article 222 of the Angolan
Constitution states that “local authorities must promote solidarity with
each other on the basis of their specific characteristics, with the aim of 
61. On constituent power and the constitutional order, see YANIV ROZNAI, ‘WE 
THE PEOPLE’, ‘QUI, THE PEOPLE’ AND THE COLLECTIVE BODY: PERCEPTIONS OF 
CONSTITUENT POWER, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 295 (Gary J. Jacob-
sohn & Miguel Schor eds., 2018).
62. COL. CONST. art. 1 (Columbia). 
63. ROM. CONST. art. 4.
64. ARG. CONST. art. 75 (2).
65. SPAN. CONST. art. 22.
66. CHILE CONST. art. 3.
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reducing local and regional imbalances and imbalances in national de-
velopment.”67 
In states that endorse an ethnic or cultural national model, a shared
cultural identity, rather than citizenship alone, often defines the solidar-
ity group. The Constitution of Bangladesh, for example, states that “the 
unity and solidarity of the Bangalee nation, which, deriving its identity
from its language and culture, attained sovereign and independent Bang-
ladesh through a united and determined struggle in the War of Independ-
ence, shall be the basis of Bangalee nationalism.”68 Where cultural differ-
ences exist within the state, and where they have historically been a
source of tension or may be perceived as a threat, solidarity among the 
different ethnic or cultural groups may be referenced as being of  value.69 
Ethno-national states’ constitutions may define the “solidarity
group” to include individuals who are not citizens and do not necessarily
reside in the state. For example, the Angolan Constitution refers to soli-
darity in several places, embracing a bounded notion of solidarity that is 
generally defined nationally. The solidarity group encompasses not only 
citizens, but also “Angolan communities” based abroad and “communities 
who have a relationship with Angola based on origin, consanguinity, cul-
ture or history.”70 Article 6 of Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the
Jewish People, titled “connection with the Jewish people”, states that, 
“the State shall strive to ensure the safety of members of the Jewish Peo-
ple and of its citizens, who are in trouble and in captivity, due to their
Jewishness or due to their citizenship” and that “the State shall act, in 
the Diaspora, to preserve the ties between the State and members of the
Jewish People.”71 
Another facet of intrastate solidarity is intergenerational solidarity.
The preamble to the Constitution of Armenia speaks of “freedom, general
well-being, and civic solidarity of the generations.”72 Article 66(2) of the
Constitution of Portugal states that the state is charged with “[p]romot-
ing the rational use of natural resources, while safeguarding their ability
to renew themselves and maintain ecological stability, with respect for 
the principle of intergenerational solidarity,”73 and Article 7 of the Bel-
gium Constitution states that “the Federal State, the Communities and 
67. ANGL. CONST. art. 222. References to solidarity among different geo-
graphical regions or municipalities within the country are also included in other
constitutions. See, e.g., CENT. AFR. REP. CONST. art. 55.; CAMEROON CONST. art. 55.
68. BANGL. CONST. art. 9. 
69. CAMEROON CONST. pmbl.
70. ANGL. CONST. art. 86.
71. §§ 6(a)-(b), Basic Law: the Knesset (Isr.).
72. ARM. CONST. pmbl.
73. PORT. CONST. art. 66(2). 



































the Regions follow the objectives of lasting development in its social, eco-
nomic and environmental aspects, taking into account the solidarity be-
tween the generations.”74 
Intrastate solidarity is often associated with duties, as may be ex-
pected from the notion that the core of it is commitment. An important 
issue, in this respect, is to whom these duties apply.. In some cases, the 
value of solidarity expresses the state’s commitments towards individual
members of the political community (however it is defined), and the du-
ties that stem from this value are imposed, first and foremost, on the 
state’s institutions. This understanding of solidarity as well as the duties
that derive from it is strongly associated with constitutional endorsement
of the welfare-state model and with the recognition of social rights. While 
these policies may ultimately impose derivative duties upon individuals
(i.e., the duty to pay taxes), their primary obligations under this notion
of solidarity are imposed upon the state. 
A different notion of intrastate solidarity emphasized commitments
of individual members of the political community towards other members
or towards the state. The preamble to the Algerian Constitution men-
tions the “efforts” and “sacrifices” made by the Algerian army, and states
that “those efforts have contributed to strengthening the nationalistic 
bond and consecrating the spirit of solidarity between the people and
their army.”75 The Constitution of Bhutan states that: “A Bhutanese cit-
izen shall foster tolerance, mutual respect and spirit of brotherhood
amongst all the people of Bhutan transcending religious, linguistic, re-
gional or sectional diversities.”76 
From a liberal perspective, the imposition of duties upon individu-
als, in particular towards the state, is reason for concern. Solidarity, from
this perspective, may serve as a pretext and excuse for curtaining indi-
vidual freedom. This may certainly be the case, and constitutions of au-
thoritarian states do indeed include references to solidarity that appear 
to be designed to achieve this goal.77 
Contrary to such suspicious notion of solidarity, other constitutional
notions of solidarity emphasize commitments and duties towards dis-
privileged members of society,78 including people with disabilities,79 or as
74. BELG. CONST. art. 7bis.
75. ALG. CONST. pmbl.
76. BHUTAN CONST. art. 8(3).
77. See, e.g., BURUNDI CONST. art. 70 (stating “[t]he State can proclaim the
solidarity of all in regard to obligations which result from natural and national
disasters”).
78. ANGL. CONST. art. 21.
79. Id. art. 83.
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a value or principle of the education system.80 In general, the notion of
solidarity often appears in association with other principles relating to 
social justice or social and economic rights.  Solidarity also appears in
connection to the rights of workers within the state. Article 64 of the
Costa Rican Constitution states, “in the same way, it will recognize the
right of employers and workers to organize themselves freely in associa-
tions of solidarity, in order to obtain better conditions of life and economic 
and social development.”81 
While most constitutional references to solidarity focus on interstate
solidarity, a considerable number of constitutions include references to 
global or cosmopolitan solidarity. In this section, I use the term transna-
tional solidarity to refer both to solidarity among states or nations, where 
states are the commitment-owing units, and to cosmopolitan solidarity,
which emphasizes solidarity among individuals across borders. 
Both types of transnational solidarity can be found in national con-
stitutions. In its preamble, for example, the Algerian Constitution refers
to Algeria’s “traditions of solidarity and justice,” which render “the peo-
ple…confident of its capacities to work fully for the cultural, social and 
economic progress of the world, today and tomorrow.”82 Article 30 of the
Algerian Constitution declares that “Algeria shall extend its solidarity to
all peoples who are fighting for political and economic liberation, for the 
right of self-determination and against all racial discrimination.”83 Arti-
cle 1(3) of the Constitution of Nicaragua states that “the struggle for 
peace and the establishment of a just world order represent fundamental 
commitments of the Nicaraguan nation. We therefore oppose all forms of
colonialist and imperialist domination and exploitation and declare our 
solidarity with all countries fighting against oppression and discrimina-
tion.”84 Article 25 of the Constitution of Bangladesh refers to solidarity in
the context of the management of international relations.85 
Regional solidarity is another, more confined version of transna-
tional solidarity. References to such solidarity are common in the global
80. Article 14 of the Austrian Constitution states that “Democracy, Human-
ity, solidarity, peace and justice as well as openness and tolerance towards people
are the elementary values of the school, based on which it secures for the whole
population, independent from origin, social situation and financial background a
maximum of educational level . . . .” AUSTRIA CONST. art. 14.
81. COSTA RICA CONST. art. 64.
82. ALG. CONST. pmbl.
83. Id. art. 30.
84. NIC. CONST. tit. I, art. 3.
85. BANGL. CONST. art. 25. 
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south and can be found in many constitutions of Latin-American and Af-
rican states. The constitution of Morocco includes several references to
solidarity, including a declaration that Morocco commits itself “to consol-
idate relations of cooperation and of solidarity with the peoples and the
countries of Africa, notably the sub-Saharan countries and the [coun-
tries] of the Sahel.”86 The Constitution of Cameroon states that “the sal-
vation of Africa lies in forging ever-growing bonds of solidarity among 
African Peoples”87 
Another form of solidarity that extends beyond the state is solidarity
that is based on a shared ideology.88 Traditionally, the notion of solidarity
played a central role in socialist class struggles89 and in the context of
workers’ rights.90 This role is still echoed in some constitutions. Thus, the
Constitution of the Republic of Cuba states that it “bases its relationships
with countries that edify socialism on fraternal friendship, cooperation,
and mutual assistance.”91 
The idea that solidarity should transcend national borders is a pillar
of cosmopolitan moralism, which is, as indicated above, suspicious to-
wards intrastate, bounded solidarity, and is perceived as conflicting with 
the strive towards cosmopolitanism. However, the inclusion of transna-
tional notions of solidarity in national constitutions indicates that, even
from a national perspective, this is not necessarily the case, and various
layers and types of solidarity are not perceived to be mutually exclusive. 
While some constitutional references to solidarity specify who the 
solidarity group is, many constitutions include a general reference to sol-
idarity, without specifying among whom it exists or what specific com-
mitments and duties stem from it. 
Solidarity is often referred to, in this context, as a collectivist notion,
either alongside other principles of social justice or as supplementing in-
dividualistic principles and values, such as human dignity. For example, 
86. MOROCCO CONST. pmbl.
87. CAMEROON CONST. pmbl. 
88. Kurasawa suggests that “solidarity from below” can also emerge from
“political alliances between individuals and groups from various part on the
world,” with respect to various issues. Kurasawa, supra note 14, at 325.
89. Banting and Kymlicka argue that “although Marx seldom used the term,
his few references concerned solidarity within the working class.” Banting & 
Kymlicka, supra note 11, at 5. 
90. See  Marion Crain & Ken Mathen, Sexual Harassment and Solidarity, 87 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 56, 83 (2019) (discussing labor solidarity in the United
States).
91. CUBA CONST. art. 16(n).
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Article 5 of the Constitution of Georgia states that: “The State shall take 
care of strengthening the principles of social justice, social equality, and 
social solidarity within society.”92 
The Preamble of the Constitution of the Indian Constitution states 
that the State will promote “fraternity, assuring the dignity of the indi-
vidual and the unity and integrity of the Nation.”93 The Preamble to the
Albanian Constitution declares that the constitution is established “with
a pledge to protect human dignity and personhood, as well as for the pros-
perity of the whole nation, for peace, well-being, culture and social soli-
darity.”94 The Bolivian constitution states that: “State based on respect
and equality for all, on principles of sovereignty, dignity, interdepend-
ence, solidarity, harmony, and equity in the distribution and redistribu-
tion of the social wealth.”95 Article 1(1) of the Angolan Constitution states
that “Angola shall be a sovereign and independent Republic, based on the
dignity of the individual and the will of the Angolan people, whose pri-
mary objective shall be to build a free, just, democratic, solidary society 
of peace, equality, and social progress.”96 Article 2 of the French Consti-
tution declares that “the maxim of the Republic shall be ‘Liberty, Equal-
ity, Fraternity.’”97 
Many of the constitutions that declare solidarity to be a value or 
principle, including some of the constitutions surveyed above, refer to
more than one type or aspect of solidarity. Constitutions may include 
general references to solidarity alongside references to transnational sol-
idarity, as well as to intrastate solidarity. 
Some constitutions do not include specific references to solidarity,
but solidarity can nonetheless be inferred to be a constitutional value
from either other explicit values that are closely related to solidarity,
from the explicit articulation of constitutional duties that reflect a com-
mitment to solidarity, or from the articulation of social and economic
rights that can be perceived as deriving from a value of solidarity.98 In
other cases, it may be more difficult to argue that solidarity is a consti-
tutional value. One such example is the United States. Ruti Teitel argues
that the central U.S. constitutional values are freedom and equality, with 
92. GA. CONST. art. V.
93. INDIA CONST. pmbl. 
94. ALB. CONST. pmbl.
95. BOL.CONST. pmbl, art. 8.
96. ANGL. CONST. art. 1(1). 
97. FR. CONST. art. 2. 
98. Albert H.Y. Chen, Constitutional Values in Three Chinese Societies, in
GLOBAL VALUES, supra note 49, at 119, 141.
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freedom receiving primacy.99 The focus on individual liberty, and the fact
that equality jurisprudence has developed mostly to encompass anti-dis-
crimination, render it difficult to locate within current United States con-
stitutionalism communitarian values such as solidarity. 
Of course, the fact that solidarity is written into a constitution does
not say much about its actual significance or role in a country’s constitu-
tional framework. In some cases, it may be a dead letter, or an aspira-
tional value that is not fulfilled. In worst cases it may serve as a pretext 
for curtailing individual freedom through subordination to alleged collec-
tive interests.100 However, at least in some cases, solidarity can be the
premise for evaluating state acts and legislation, while also promoting
an array of social and economic rights, such as healthcare, social security, 
and education.101 
The existence of different notions of constitutional solidarity and the 
existence of more than one type of solidarity within a single constitution 
suggests that constitutions can serve as the foundation not only of intra-
state solidarity but also of transnational solidarity, and, more im-
portantly, of complex, multi-layered solidarity. Like many constitutional 
terms, the type of work that solidarity may be able to do depends on the 
way it is interpreted and, more importantly, on the manner and cases in 
which it is applied. However, the explicit constitutional endorsement of
solidarity as a value is important both from an expressive perspective, 
and as a value to which judges may turn to when interpreting or evalu-
ating legislation as well as policies.
IV. THE CONTENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL SOLIDARITY 
A. Solidarity and Duties 
What does a constitutional value of solidarity entail from a substan-
tive perspective? As demonstrated above, solidarity appears in constitu-
tions in an array of contexts – in the preamble and in specific articles, as 
a general principle, value, or, with respect to rights and duties, as a
99. Ruti Teitel, Global Constitutional Values in the United States, in GLOBAL
VALUES, supra note 49 at 393.
100. See, e.g., Allan R. Brewer-Carías, Global Values in the Venezuelan Con-
stitutions: Some Prioritisations and Several Incongruences, in  GLOBAL VALUES,
supra note 49, at 417 (discussing Venezuela). 
101. Fábio Canavalho Leite and Florian F. Hoffmann state that in Brazil,
“the constitution employs the concept of solidarity. Among the purposes of the
Brazilian republic listed in article 3 is ‘the construction of a free and just society
in solidarity’, as well as ‘the eradication of poverty and exclusion, and of social
and regional inequalities.’” Fábio Canavalho Leite & Florian F. Hoffmann, Global
Values and Local Realities: Brazilian Constitutional Law, in GLOBAL VALUES, su-
pra note 49, at 69, 84. 
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notion that applies internally, within the political community, or as a 
notion that applies transnationally. It is impossible to provide a single
answer to this question. 
However, with the required caution, several characteristics common 
to the various constitutional notions of solidarity can be sketched. At the
core of solidarity is the notion of commitment. Accordingly, constitutions
usually refer to solidarity to emphasize duties rather than rights. In some
constitutions these are the duties of the state towards individuals, e.g., 
welfare and social justice.
In other cases, solidarity is presented as the basis of duties of indi-
viduals towards each other or towards the political community as a
whole.  Article 2 of the Greek constitution states that “[t]he State has the
right to claim of all citizens to fulfil the duty of social and national soli-
darity.”102 Article 75 of the constitution of the Dominican Republic states
that one of the fundamental duties of the people is “[t]o act in accordance 
with the principle of social solidarity, responding with humanitarian ac-
tion to situations of public calamity or that put the lives or health of peo-
ple in danger.”103 The Cuban Constitution explicitly states that “[t]he ex-
ercise of the rights and liberties provided for in this Constitution implies 
responsibilities. They are duties of Cuban citizens . . . [t]o act, in one’s
relations with other people, according to the principle of human solidarity
and with respect to the norms of a proper social coexistence.”104 
The association of solidarity with duties may explain why many lib-
eral scholars are suspicious towards its use by the state. Solidarity is a 
communitarian, collectivist notion, which may impose both direct and in-
direct duties and burdens upon individuals. Thus, it can easily be em-
ployed to limit individual freedom, to prioritize the collective over the in-
dividual, and even to invert the relationship between the state and the 
individual. However, these legitimate concerns, while not unfounded, are
not enough to categorically reject the potential contribution of a consti-
tutional value of solidarity to the promotion of justice. Indeed, the concept 
of solidarity can be a dangerous tool to be used as a justification for hin-
dering freedoms. Nonetheless, the existence of solidarity is necessary to 
ensure that rights are equally and inclusively enjoyed. Its prevalence in 
so many constitutions suggests that it should be taken seriously. The
question to focus on then, is what types of notions of solidarity should be 
102. GREECE CONST. art. 25. 
103. DOM. REP. CONST. art. 75. 
104. CUBA CONST. art. 90. The Cuban constitution also includes references to
solidarity as a general principle and to “solidarity with the assaulted party and
with the people who fight for their liberation and self-determination.” Id. art.
16(j).
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constitutionally recognized, and how should constitutional solidarity be
interpreted?  
B. Between Bounded Solidarity and Transnational Solidarity  
As indicated above, most constitutional references to solidarity per-
tain to intra-group, bounded notions of solidarity. Banting and Kymlicka
argue that such societal based solidarity has been considered by liberal 
scholars to be “at best mythical, and at worst dangerous and exclusion-
ary.”105 Since bounded solidarity has, in the recent wave of populism,
been employed to fuel the friend/enemy distinction upon which populism
thrives,106 this attitude is somewhat understandable. However, a sweep-
ing dismissal of bounded solidarity as illegitimate and irrelevant is a mis-
take. If, as argued above, solidarity is a precondition for the existence of 
a just society and for realization of human rights, then its existence
within states is of value and should be encouraged.  Inequality, economic 
disparities, exclusion of minorities, and violations of rights still prevail 
within states, and states are still the primary political units responsible
for the welfare of individuals. In many states, there are groups that are 
excluded, either de jure or de facto, from the main solidarity group, and 
as a result, enjoy inferior legal protection and are vulnerable to violations
of rights. As long as this is the case, it is both legitimate and important
to encourage an inclusive, all-encompassing intra-state solidarity. But
what is the relationship between bounded solidarity and transnational
solidarity? Are the two mutually exclusive? 
While the interest of liberal scholarship in bounded solidarity has 
been in decline, the interest in transnational solidarity has been on the 
rise, even prior to the COVID-19 crisis. The challenges of globalization,
in particular the immigration crisis in Europe, have given rise to an 
abundance of writing on the importance of transnational solidarity. This 
is particularly evident in the European context. The notion of solidarity
is central to the Lisbon Treaty, and there is a large, growing body of schol-
arship discussing the challenge of European solidarity.107 COVID-19 has,
of course, highlighted both the importance of transnational solidarity and
the challenges in achieving it. 
The specific question of European solidarity is beyond the scope of
this article. However, since much of the recent scholarship on solidarity 
emerges from the literature on this question, it is worth noting the con-
cept of solidarity in the Lisbon treaty, and, accordingly, the notion of
105. Banting & Kymlicka, supra note 11, at 5.
106. JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? 101 (2016).
107. See, e.g., MALCOLM ROSS & YURI BORGMANN-PREBIL, PROMOTING 
SOLIDARITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2010). 
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solidarity in the literature on this treaty, refers to solidarity between
states, rather than to solidarity between individuals across borders. 
The notion of transnational solidarity can be characterized into sev-
eral versions. One version emphasizes the mutual commitments among 
states. For example, Article 222 of the Lisbon Treaty enshrines the soli-
darity among the “Union and its Member States.”108 Under this version,
the states are the entities among which solidarity exists. Another version
understands transnational solidarity as the source of duties of states to-
wards alien individuals.109 The third version, which I characterize as cos-
mopolitan solidarity, focuses on the solidarity among individuals world-
wide, without regard to national borders.110 The different notions of
transnational solidarity are not entirely separate, and often overlap.111 
The majority of the literature on all versions of transnational soli-
darity builds, to a large extent, on the idea that the principles and ele-
ments of national or bounded solidarity should be replicated, on a larger
scale, to a larger political unit, be it the European Union or humanity as
a whole. Habermas expressed this vision explicitly, arguing that:
By expanding the parameters for the implementation of human
rights and democracy, the nation-state made possible a new, more ab-
stract form of social integration beyond the borders of ancestry and dia-
lect. Today we are faced with the task of carrying on this process with a 
further abstractive step.112 
108. Article 222 (1) determines that:
The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of sol-
idarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the
victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise
all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources
made available by the Member States, to: (a) prevent the terrorist
threat in the territory of the Member States; protect democratic in-
stitutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack; as-
sist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political
authorities, in the event of a terrorist attack; (b) assist a Member
State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the
event of a natural or man-made disaster.
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 222, Oct. 26, 2012,
OJL. 326/47-326/390.
109. See, e.g., Sergio Dellavalle, On Sovereignty, Legitimacy, and Solidarity
Or: How Can a Solidaristic Idea of Legitimate Sovereignty Be Justified?, 16 
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 367 (2015).
110. See generally Carol C. Gould, Solidarity Between the National and the
Transnational: What Do We Owe to ‘Outsiders?’, in TRANSNATIONAL SOLIDARITY:
CONCEPT, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 22 (Helle Brunke et al. eds., 2020).
111. See Gould’s description of solidarity as a “web.” Id. at 26.
112. HABERMAS, supra note 36, at 18.

































Like others, Habermas argues that such solidarity can only be de-
veloped through the creation of a global space. He recognizes the limits
of the post-national political spheres,113 but nonetheless perceives the
way forward as involving slowly weakening the special commitments 
among members of particular states.114 This process, he hopes, will ulti-
mately lead to the rise of cosmopolitan solidarity through the emergence
of post-national personal identities. Habermas perceives cosmopolitan 
solidarity as necessary for the successful operation of international bod-
ies and institutions, such as the EU and the UN. 
While not all advocates of cosmopolitan solidarity condition it on the 
existence of a world without states, the vision of a political community 
that transcends the state recurs in the literature on post-national and
cosmopolitan solidarity. Rainer Bauböck, for example, recognizes that in
the case of the EU “nation building at the level of the supranational polity
is categorically ruled out.” In searching for EU solidarity, he nonetheless
looks at the state as a model, seeking “kinds of sources that liberal na-
tionalists believe can be best provided by civic or thin nationhood: a sense 
of strong interdependence between various parts of a polity.”115 This
search focuses primarily on the laws and institutions of the EU. Similar-
ities between the EU and states is, thus, at its core. 
However, global solidarity does not emerge exclusively from post-
national political institutions and does not necessarily depend on the ex-
istence of a post-state political world order. Solidarity is a complex, multi-
layered phenomenon. In examining the tension between cosmopolitan-
ism and communitarianism, Colás states that “possibilities arise for
thinking and acting in solidarity with distant strangers while simultane-
ously reaffirming the legitimacy of local political communities when ad-
dressing questions of rights, justice or freedom.”116 Bounded solidarity
does not necessarily conflict with transnational solidarity but can also be 
based in domestic values and be part of a particular collective identity. 
As Bauböck and Habermas envision, commitment towards those who are
not part of the polity may indeed develop in supra-national spaces.  Thus,
political communities may cultivate solidarity beyond the polity while, at 
113. Bailey explains that Habermas recognizes the economic, cultural and
environmental problems created by the interdependencies of economies and soci-
eties “cannot be resolved by extending democratic deliberations to the global
level, particularly because it is unlikely to be sufficient solidarity among mem-
bers of different states.” Tom Bailey, Introduction, in  DEPROVINCIALIZING
HABERMAS: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 1,4 (Tom Bailey ed., 2013). 
114. Id.  
115. Rainer Bauböck, Citizenship and Collective Identities as Political
Sources of Solidarity in the European Union, in STRAINS OF COMMITMENT, supra
note 11, at 3. 
116. Colás, supra note 7, at 1058.
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the same time, strive to preserve their own collective identity. Solidarity 
beyond the polity may be perceived as a facet of such identity, rather than 
a threat to it. 
My claim here is that constitutional law can be a source of cultivat-
ing transnational solidarity from below, i.e., “bottom-up.” The Lisbon
treaty is an example of attempts to establish transnational solidarity in 
a “top-down” manner – through an international treaty which entrenches 
solidarity between states as a value, and with which states are required 
to comply. However, when transnational solidarity – whether global, Eu-
ropean, or cosmopolitan – is entrenched in a domestic constitution, it is
endorsed as part of the state’s own constitutional identity. While “top-
down” attempts to establish transnational solidarity have encountered
suspicion and been perceived by some as external intervention, constitu-
tional endorsement of transnational solidarity can cultivate such solidar-
ity from a domestic perspective, rooted in a state’s own values and cul-
ture. This may supplement “top-down” instruments, addressing the 
challenge of creating transnational solidarity through a more holistic ap-
proach. 
V. JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF SOLIDARITY – TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE 
OF SOLIDARITY 
Solidarity Beyond the Nation – Decision no. 2018-717/718 QPC
Decision no. 2018-717/718 QPC, delivered by the French Constitu-
tional Council on July 6, 2018, demonstrates the potential a constitu-
tional notion of solidarity may have in fostering transnational solidarity
and protecting vulnerable individuals.
The decision regarded the constitutionality of criminal laws, or what
have been termed in France as “Solidarity Offences,” that rendered it an 
offence to assist or facilitate foreign people in entering or staying in 
France illegally, subject to certain exemptions. Convictions delivered un-
der these laws have been a matter of controversy in France. The most 
renowned of them is the case of Cédric Herrou, a farmer convicted for
transporting and assisting illegal immigrants. Relying on the constitu-
tional principle of Fratenité, the Constitutional Council ruled the law un-
der which Herrou was convicted to be partially unconstitutional, expand-
ing the exemptions from criminal responsibility by invalidating part of 
the law and offering elaborate interpretation of another.
The Constitutional Council based its ruling on the principle of fra-
ternity. The ruling relied on Article W of the Constitution, which deter-
mined that “[t]he French Republic’s maxim shall be ‘Liberty, Equality, 
Fraternity.’” The Preamble and Article 72-3 of the Constitution also re-
fers to the “common ideal of liberty, equality and fraternity.” The Council 
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states that “[f]raternity is a principle which has constitutional value.”117 
It further explained that “[i]t follows from the principle of fraternity the
freedom to help one another, for humanitarian reasons, without consid-
eration as to whether the assisted person is legally residing or not within
the French territory.”118 The Council explained that the principle of fra-
ternity, as other constitutional principles, was not absolute and was to 
be balanced against the need to protect public order. However, it found 
the existing balance to be partially unacceptable, thus reaching the con-
clusion that the law under which Herrou was convicted was partially un-
constitutional.  
Benjamin Boudou argues that the importance of the decision is the
way the Council employed the principle of fraternity. “Operationalizing 
the constitutional principle of fraternity and applying it beyond the strict 
borders of the citizenry,” he argues, “constitutes a giant step towards a
cosmopolitan understanding of French republican values and a strong
signal that could inspire a more hospitable Europe.”119 Others have sim-
ilarly hailed the Council’s choice to put the principle of fraternity into
practice, infusing it with substantive meaning, rather than leaving it as
a merely symbolic declaration.  
The Herrou decision received considerable attention in the context 
of the debate on Europe’s treatment of illegal immigrants, and its imme-
diate importance is, of course, in this regard. However, in the context of 
an inquiry into the meaning and value of constitutional solidarity, the
decision is important in two additional respects. First, it demonstrates
that the concept of solidarity is not too vague or ambiguous to have any 
legal meaning, and that it can play an actual and central role in consti-
tutional adjudication. Second, the decision demonstrates that national
courts applying constitutional solidarity will not necessarily apply it in 
an exclusionary manner, and that they may interpret and apply a consti-
tutional value of solidarity in a manner that will encourage transnational
solidarity.  
CONCLUSION 
This article outlines the potential and the perils of constitutional
solidarity in promoting justice and equitable protection of rights.  It ar-
gues that the tendency of liberal scholarship to treat the notion of soli-
darity with suspicion is understandable. However, solidarity is a 
117. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2018-
717/718 QPC, July 6, 2018, ¶ 7 (Fr.).
118. Id. ¶ 8.
119. Benjamin Boudou, The Solidarity Offense in France: Egalité, Fraternité,
Solidarité!, VERFBLOG (July 6, 2018), https://verfassungsblog.de/the-solidarity-of-
fense-in-france-egalite-fraternite-solidarite.
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precondition for the existence of just societies and for distributive justice, 
as well as for ensuring that human rights are equally realized. 
As demonstrated in this article, solidarity is endorsed as a value in
a large number of constitutions, both explicitly and implicitly. Dismissing
the relevance of solidarity as a constitutional value only leaves it to be
manipulated by nationalist, populist politics. Constitutional solidarity is
a legitimate and important concept; the question to be addressed is what 
it endorses, and how it is to be applied. 
Recognizing solidarity as a constitutional value should play a role in
the course of constitutional and legislative interpretation, as well as in 
evaluating the constitutionality of specific laws. As an overarching value,
solidarity may come into play in examining laws in a variety of areas:
from welfare through healthcare120 to immigration. Explicitly addressing
the issue of solidarity with respect to these issues is an important step in 
defining the boundaries and content of mutual duties in a society. This, 
in turn, is important in crystallizing what a just society is perceived to 
be in a given political community. Explicitly addressing these issues al-
lows us both to critically assess such notions, and to promote them,
should we find them equitable. 
Explicit constitutional references to solidarity render it easier for
courts to refer to solidarity as a value than implicit, embedded notions of
solidarity. However, this does not imply that the latter is an unattainable
task. On the other hand, anchoring decisions in constitutional values ex-
poses courts to criticism. Anchoring them in unenumerated values may 
indeed raise the odds of such criticism, but it is a consideration that dif-
ferent courts accord different weight to.
Contrary to the simplistic manner in which solidarity is used in
identity-politics, the relationship between collective identity and solidar-
ity is complex. solidarity is a multi-layered phenomenon which can and 
should be reflected in the constitutional manifestation of solidarity. Con-
stitutions can and should refer to more than one layer of solidarity, and 
courts can and should play a part in instilling substance to these layers.
Where solidarity is recognized as a value, it can serve to examine the
effect of laws and policies on under-privileged members of society, and be
a source for deriving both duties and rights. In this article, I argued that
more scholarly attention should be paid to the notion of solidarity as a 
constitutional value and outlined some of the issues and questions that
arise with respect to this value. Further research, exploration, and
120. Healthcare is actually one of the areas in which solidarity is often ref-
erenced, although not in a constitutional context. See, e.g., Nili Karako-Eyal, Be-
yond the Ethical Boundaries of Solidarity: Increasing Vaccination Rates Through
Mandatory Education to Solidarity, 6 TEX. A&M L. REV. 345 (2019).





investigation of solidarity as a constitutional value is needed. Such ex-
ploration, I believe, can help us better understand the dynamics of soli-
darity and the role that law, particularly constitutional law, plays and 
can play in fostering and enhancing solidarity.
